Collaborative governance forums involving many diverse stakeholders sometimes use caucuses to facilitate deliberation of the complex issues they face. However, given the paucity of research on this topic, a better theoretical understanding of the conditions under which a caucus structure is likely to be effective is warranted. For this study, we developed a computational model of decision making in collaborative forums to explore how a caucus structure can be designed and managed to enable egalitarian, consensus-based decision processes. The simulation results indicated that constraints on caucus autonomy through the use of a coordinating structure can enhance the acceptability of the forum’s decision, the effect of which is contingent on problem complexity and the number of caucuses. A greater balance of power within caucuses enhanced the ability of the forums to reach agreement on acceptable solutions. We offer propositions based on a discussion of the implications of the simulation results.
Caucuses in Collaborative Governance: Modeling the Effects of Structure, Power, and Problem Complexity
International Journal of Public Management
Year: 2014